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FROM SCARCITY TO ABUNDANCE: THE 
CHANGING DYNAMICS OF ENERGY 
CONFLICT 
Michael T. Klare* 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2012, the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
triggered headlines around the world when it announced that the 
United States, by dint of its success in utilizing new extractive 
technologies, would likely overtake Saudi Arabia to become the 
world’s leading oil producer by 2020.1  At a time in which many 
analysts had come to believe that the world was facing an impending 
“peak” in global oil output followed by an irreversible decline,2 the 
IEA’s report was said to herald a new and unexpected era of 
hydrocarbon plenty.  In commenting on the report, many analysts 
spoke in particular about the purported economic benefits of energy 
abundance, notably the prospect of new jobs and manufacturing 
activities.3  As the IEA indicated, however, the new energy bounty 
                                                
* Michael T. Klare, Five College Professor of Peace and World Security 
Studies, and director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security 
Studies (PAWSS) at Hampshire College.  
1 International Energy Agency (IEA), WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 
52, 157 (2012),  
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2012_free.pd
f. 
2 See, e.g., KENNETH S. DEFFEYES, HUBBERT’S PEAK: THE IMPENDING 
WORLD OIL SHORTAGE (2001); Robert L. Hirsch, The Inevitable Peaking of World Oil 
Production, 26 BULL. ATL. COUNCIL U.S. 1-9 (Oct. 2005). 
3 See, e.g., Saudi America, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873238947045781145911744
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has political and military implications.  “This energy renaissance,” it 
declared, “has far-reaching consequences for energy markets, trade, 
and, potentially, even for energy security, geopolitics, and the global 
economy.”4 
Energy security and geopolitics have, of course, played a 
pivotal role in international affairs for a very long time, ever since the 
development of oil-powered vehicles and weapons of war.  As the 
demand for petroleum exploded, especially in the years during and 
after World War I, the major military and industrial powers fought 
with one another for control over the world’s handful of oil-
producing areas.  Gaining access to foreign oil supplies was also a 
major war aim of Germany and Japan during World II and a major 
concern of the United States during the Cold War era.  After the 
Cold War, the United States continued to place a high priority on 
ensuring its access to foreign oil supplies, employing military force on 
several occasions to protect the oil flow from the Persian Gulf.5  The 
2012 IEA statement suggested, however, that the well-established 
relationship between energy and geopolitics would be profoundly 
altered as a result of the current “energy renaissance.” 
As an energy-specific organization, the IEA did not offer its 
own prognosis on the geopolitical implications of its suggestive 
comment, except to note that we should expect a shift in the center 
of gravity of world oil and natural gas production from the Middle 
East to North America.6  Nevertheless, it is obvious from its analysis 
that this shift and other consequences of the “renaissance” will have 
profound implications for the foreign and security policies of both 
energy importing and exporting nations and for the prospects for 
                                                
53074; Ed Crooks, U.S. Shale Gas Sparks a Chemical Revolution, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d1a183d2-40a3-11e2-aafa-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3B4D6zQZy; Jim Motavalli, Natural Gas Signals a 
‘Manufacturing Renaissance,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/business/energy-environment/wider-
availability-expands-uses-for-natural-gas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
4 IEA, supra note 1, at 74. 
5 See generally MICHAEL T. KLARE, BLOOD AND OIL 26-55 (2004). 
6 WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 1, at 74-80. 
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conflict over oil and gas.  In particular, policies aimed at securing the 
safe flow of oil from the Middle East to markets in the West—a 
source of repeated crisis and conflict in the past—are now being 
called into question, while disputes over new sources of energy, such 
as those in offshore areas and the Arctic, have gained fresh attention.  
More importantly, the very basis for energy-driven security policies—
an expectation of perpetually inadequate supplies of hydrocarbons—
appears to have been rendered invalid by the dramatic rise in global 
output, raising doubts about the future likelihood of wars over oil.7 
Will conflict over energy supplies disappear in an era of oil 
and gas abundance?  Or will it take new forms, governed by the 
changing geography of global supply and demand?  Although it is still 
too early to provide a definitive answer to these questions, it is 
possible to detect several significant trends in energy geopolitics—all 
suggesting that the risk of conflict over oil and natural gas supplies 
will not disappear in an era of hydrocarbon abundance.  This essay 
will trace the origins of energy geopolitics and attempt to show how 
it is being affected by the development of new production 
technologies. 
I.  THE GEOPOLITICS OF SCARCITY 
The relationship between oil and geopolitics first arose during 
World War I when oil-powered weapons—tanks, planes, and 
submarines—first made their appearance on the battlefield and the 
major powers scoured the world for reliable sources of supply.  With 
reserves limited and only a few major deposits then in production—
mostly in the United States, Romania, Iran (then Persia), and Baku in 
the Czarist empire—the principal belligerents sought to control these 
                                                
7 See generally Ed Crooks & Geoff Dyer, Energy Security: Strength in Reserve, 
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/916a6744-0f14-11e3-
8e58-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BMCFD8uY; Daniel Yergin, America’s New Energy 
Security, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2011, 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240529702044498045770689320269
51376. 
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areas or deny their opponents access to them.  After the war, the 
surviving great powers engaged in a competitive struggle to extend 
their sway in the major oil-producing areas, especially in the Persian 
Gulf area and the Caucasus.8 
Many scholars believe that it was Winston Churchill who first 
grasped the geopolitical significance of oil and its association with the 
Persian Gulf.  In 1912, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill 
ordered the conversion of British warships from coal to oil 
propulsion in the belief that this would give them an advantage over 
Germany’s coal-powered ships in the event of war.9  Because Great 
Britain at that time did not possess domestic oil reserves of its own 
(the North Sea fields were not discovered until much later), Churchill 
determined that London must obtain a secure overseas source of oil 
under direct British authority.  The most propitious option, he 
concluded, was to impose government control over the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company (APOC, the forerunner of British Petroleum), 
which had secured a concession to promising reserves in 
southwestern Persia.  As a result of his prodding, Parliament voted in 
1914 to nationalize APOC and bring its Persian concession under 
London’s control.  From that point onward, the protection of 
APOC’s concession area, and of British supply lines to the Persian 
Gulf (especially the Suez Canal), were viewed as matters of vital 
national security by the British government.10 
The strategic aspect of the international competition for oil 
reserves continued to play a significant role in international relations 
after World War I and in the years leading up to the Second World 
War.  The major European powers, possessing few domestic oil 
reserves of their own, focused much of their efforts on acquiring a 
foothold in the oil-bearing regions of the Middle East.  This was the 
era of the San Remo Agreement of 1920, under which Britain 
obtained control over Iraq through a mandate from the League of 
                                                
8 See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY 
& POWER 184-206 (2001) [hereinafter THE PRIZE]. 
9 See generally GEOFFREY JONES, THE STATE AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
THE BRITISH OIL INDUSTRY 9–31 (1981). 
10 Id. at 129–76; see also THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 153–64. 
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Nations.11  Meanwhile, Japan—a rising industrial power with a similar 
paucity of oil—harbored imperial ambitions over the Dutch East 
Indies, then the major producer in Asia. 
The need to secure overseas sources of oil played a significant 
role in the strategic planning of Germany and Japan, both of which 
sought to invade and conquer foreign producing areas in order to 
fuel their military forces and industrial systems.  In 1941, when full-
scale combat broke out, both undertook military strikes with this 
purpose in mind: Germany invaded the Soviet Union, with Baku as 
one of its primary objectives; Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies.  
With Washington becoming increasingly alarmed by Japan’s 
aggressive moves in Asia, Japanese leaders concluded that its invasion 
of the Dutch East Indies would provoke a U.S. military response of 
some sort.  Japan simultaneously attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl 
Harbor in Hawaii, thus ensuring American entry into the war.12 
Until this point, the United States had not participated in the 
strategic—as distinct from the commercial—pursuit of overseas oil, 
as it possessed sufficient domestic reserves to satisfy its wartime 
military requirements and those of its principal allies.  As World War 
II progressed, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his 
senior advisers became worried that the heavy wartime extraction of 
domestic oil was rapidly depleting U.S. reserves, thereby eroding 
America’s capacity to sustain another full-scale war on the magnitude 
of World War II.13  Accordingly, Roosevelt ordered the State and 
Commerce Departments to seek a reliable foreign source of oil to 
                                                
11 See generally JOHN KEAY, SOWING THE WIND: THE SEEDS OF 
CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 124-29 (2003). 
12 See THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 328-67. 
13 At this time, American geologists were unaware of major deposits in 
Alaska and the deeper waters of the Gulf of Mexico, making it appear that U.S. 
reserves were shrinking faster than later proved to be the case. 
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supplement American reserves in the event of a major future 
conflict.14 
After considering the various possibilities, government 
experts became convinced that Saudi Arabia constituted the best 
candidate to serve in this capacity.  Whereas most of the rest of the 
Persian Gulf area was controlled by Great Britain, Saudi Arabia had 
largely escaped British control.  In addition, the Saudi monarch, King 
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, had granted a substantial concession to an 
American oil firm, Standard Oil of California (Socal, later Chevron), 
giving the United States a significant presence in the country.  On 
this basis, Roosevelt decided in 1943 to anoint Saudi Arabia as 
America’s preferred foreign supplier of oil and to bring the Kingdom 
under American military protection.  Saudi Arabia was made eligible 
for U.S. aid under the Lend-Lease Act and consideration was given to 
the construction of a U.S. air base there. To bolster these efforts, 
Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz on February 14, 1945, and forged an 
agreement with him under which the United States received 
privileged access to Saudi oil in return for a United States pledge to 
protect the monarchy against its assorted enemies.15 
With the Roosevelt-Abdul Aziz agreement in place, the 
United States began to insert a permanent military presence in the 
Gulf region.  This led, in 1946-47, to the establishment of an air base 
at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and a naval base at Bahrain.16  For the 
most part, however, American policymakers relied on Great Britain 
to maintain stability in the Gulf at this time.  But, when London 
announced that it would withdraw most British forces from “East of 
Suez” by the end of 1971, Washington was forced to find another 
friendly power to carry the burden of regional security.  The United 
                                                
14 See generally AARON DEAN MILLER, SEARCH FOR SECURITY 54–57, 62–
63, 74–77 (1980); DAVID S. PAINTER, OIL AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 11–31, 
34–35 (1986).  
15 See generally MILLER, supra note 14, at 19–20, 49, 54–57, 62–63, 74–77, 
128–31; PAINTER, supra note 14, at 32–95; MICHAEL B. STOFF, OIL, WAR AND 
AMERICAN SECURITY 18–21, 35–39, 48–51, 57–88 (1980). 
16 See generally DAVID E. LONG, THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI 
ARABIA: AMBIVALENT ALLIES (1985). 
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States chose to rely on the Iranian regime of Shah Reza Mohammed 
Pahlavi (whom the Americans and British had helped install as 
absolute monarch through a CIA-orchestrated coup in 1954).17  From 
1970 to 1979, the United States provided Iran with vast supplies of 
modern arms, helping to transform the Iranian military into a potent 
regional force.18  Not surprisingly, then, the fall of the Shah in 
January 1979 produced great consternation in Washington, as there 
was no obvious alternative to assume Iran’s role as a “surrogate 
gendarme.”  Eleven months later, Washington received another 
shock when the Soviet Union commenced its invasion of 
Afghanistan, putting Soviet troops within a few hundred miles of the 
Persian Gulf and its vital energy supplies. 
II.  THE “CARTER DOCTRINE” AND BEYOND 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet takeover of 
Afghanistan triggered a thorough review of U.S. policy toward the 
Gulf.  This review coincided with significant shifts in U.S. energy 
trends.  Until the early 1970s, the United States was largely able to 
satisfy its petroleum requirements with crude from domestic reserves.  
After 1972, however, domestic production went into decline and, 
with consumption experiencing steady growth, the country was 
forced to increase its reliance on imported oil.  In 1970, imports 
accounted for twenty-one percent of total U.S. oil consumption; by 
1979, they accounted for forty-three percent of consumption.19  As 
the United States was becoming more dependent on imports, the 
major oil-producing countries were banding together to exact higher 
prices for their products and, in some cases, to use their newfound 
economic clout to extract political concessions from the major oil 
consumers.  This was especially evident in 1973-74, when members 
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
                                                
17 See STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN (2003). 
18 See MICHAEL T. KLARE, AMERICAN ARMS SUPERMARKET 127–26 
(1984). 
19 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2000 123, Table 
5.1 (2001), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038400.pdf. 
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quadrupled the price of crude and the Arab OPEC members 
imposed an embargo on sales to the United States, producing 
widespread shortages and a global economic recession.20 
With these developments in mind, then President Jimmy 
Carter and his top advisers concluded that U.S. interests in the 
Persian Gulf were too great to be entrusted into the hands of 
surrogates and must instead come under the direct protection of 
American forces.  This proposition, ever since known as the “Carter 
Doctrine,” was spelled out in the President’s State of the Union 
address of January 23, 1980: “The region which is now threatened by 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance.”21  By 
occupying Afghanistan, President Carter explained that the Soviets 
are “now attempting to consolidate a strategic position . . . that poses 
a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.”22  Given the 
importance of that oil to the United States and the world economy, 
the United States had to be ready to take decisive action: “Let our 
position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault 
will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”23 
Because the United States did not, at that time, possess any 
forces earmarked specifically for operations in the Arabian Gulf area, 
President Carter established a new military organization to implement 
this policy: the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).  He 
also announced plans to deploy additional warships in the Gulf 
proper and to acquire new bases in the surrounding region.  These 
measures received strong support from his successor, Ronald Reagan, 
                                                
20 See THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 588–632. 
21 Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, (Jan. 23, 1980) (transcript 
available at  
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml).   
22 Id. 
23 Id.; see also MICHAEL A. PALMER, GUARDIANS OF THE GULF: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S EXPANDING ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1883–1992 
101–11 (1999).  
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who elevated the RDJTF into a full-scale regional combat 
organization, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).24 
President Reagan was also the first American leader to invoke 
Carter’s pledge to use force when needed to safeguard the flow of oil. 
When Iranian forces attacked Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq 
War of 1980-88, Reagan determined that such action constituted a 
severe threat to the free flow of Persian Gulf oil and authorized the 
“reflagging” of those tankers with the American ensign, thereby 
allowing their protection by the U.S. Navy.25  On May 19, 1987, 
President Reagan stated: “Mark this point well: The use of the sea 
lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the Iranians.”26  The 
protection of Persian Gulf oil was also cited by Reagan’s successor, 
President George H.W. Bush, as the justification for U.S. efforts to 
protect Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 
August 2, 1990.  “Our country now imports nearly half the oil it 
consumes and could face a major threat to its economic 
independence,” Bush declared on August 8th.27  Hence, “the 
sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the 
United States.”28 
Today, the relationship between oil, security, and the Persian 
Gulf remains as strong as ever.  This is evident in the recurring 
statements by American leaders that the United States will use force 
if necessary to ensure the safe flow of Persian Gulf oil through the 
Strait of Hormuz in response to any effort by Iran to impede such 
shipping.  While the Persian Gulf has remained the principal focus of 
U.S. efforts to safeguard the global flow of oil, Washington has 
                                                
24 PALMER, supra note 23, at 112–17. 
25 Id. at 122–49. 
26 Id. at 124 (quoting Ronald Reagan, Presidential Statement, (May 19, 
1987)).  
27 George H.W. Bush, Television Address, (Aug 8, 1990) (transcript 
available at N.Y. TIMES, Aug 9, 1990). 
28 Id.  
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extended its protective shield to other oil-producing areas, especially 
the Caspian Sea basin and West Africa.29 
This drive to secure new sources of energy began under 
President Clinton, who placed particular emphasis on the Caspian Sea 
region.  After the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 
independent states in the Caspian basin, Clinton viewed this area as a 
promising new source of energy as well as a strategic alternative to 
reliance on the Persian Gulf.  While eager to tap into the newly-
accessible oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian area, Clinton 
understood that any drive to direct Caspian Sea energy to the West 
would require a substantial reorganization of the region’s energy 
transportation system, as all existing export conduits dated from the 
Soviet era and traveled through Russia before reaching Western 
markets—a form of dependence on Moscow that Washington sought 
to escape.30  To establish an alternative export route to the West, 
Clinton lobbied for construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline, connecting Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea to 
Turkey’s Mediterranean coast via Georgia.  Because this conduit 
passed through or near several areas of ethnic unrest, including 
Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, Clinton also 
promised to bolster the military forces of the transit countries.  In 
this manner, the safe flow of Caspian oil to the West became a matter 
of U.S. national security, as was the flow of Persian Gulf oil under 
the Carter Doctrine.31 
Just as President Clinton had extended the Carter Doctrine to 
the Caspian Sea basin, President Bush extended it to West Africa.  
Like the Caspian region, West Africa was said to be of strategic 
importance to the United States both because of its prolific energy 
supplies and as an alternative to reliance on the Middle East.32  As 
                                                
29 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: 
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2004 322-23 (Feb. 2003), 
http://fas.org/asmp/resources/110th/CBJ08.pdf.  
30 The Caspian Sea itself is land-bound, so any oil or natural gas exiting 
the region for markets elsewhere must travel by pipeline or rail cars. 
31 See generally BLOOD AND OIL, supra note 5, at 132–39. 
32 See id. at 142–45. 
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Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner observed in 2002, 
“African oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase 
and become more important as we go forward.”33  On this basis, the 
United States has provided favored African governments with 
various forms of military assistance, just as it has those in the Caspian 
Sea region.34  In further recognition of the area’s growing strategic 
importance, President Bush established a new military organization 
for the region, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).  Although 
the establishment of AFRICOM was not explicitly tied to the 
protection of oil—as was the case for CENTCOM—it is evident 
from the historical record that concern over instability in the oil-
producing areas of Africa was one of the motivating factors.35 
III.  THE END OF SCARCITY 
Even today, the United States is pursuing a strategy driven in 
large part by concern over the safety of foreign oil supplies.  In the 
Persian Gulf, U.S. forces are poised to counter any effort by Iran to 
block oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz; likewise, American 
forces are involved in efforts to help protect oil pipelines in the 
Caspian Sea basin and offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Guinea.36  
While the safety of foreign oil supplies remains a major responsibility 
of the U.S. military, the economic and strategic underpinnings of 
these activities have shifted.  Because of a sudden and significant 
increase in domestic energy production, the United States needs far 
                                                
33 Mike Crawley, With Mideast Uncertainty, US Turns to Africa for Oil, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 23, 2002, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0523/p07s01-woaf.html. 
34 Annual appropriations for military aid to Africa are tabulated in the 
U.S. Department of State’s Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Operations, discussed in Michael Klare & Daniel Volman, The African ‘Oil Rush’ and 
US National Security, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 609–28 (Aug. 22, 2006). 
35 See LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34003, AFRICA 
COMMAND: U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN 
AFRICA 15–16 (July 22, 2011), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf. 
36 See, e.g., MICHAEL T. KLARE, RISING POWERS, SHRINKING PLANET 
115–209 (2008). 
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less imported oil than it did before; at the same time, U.S. oil 
consumption has leveled off in response to the global economic 
downturn and increases in the fuel efficiency of American vehicles.  
In place of scarcity, pundits and policymakers are now speaking of 
energy abundance as the determining factor in U.S. strategic planning.  
“Instead of facing an Era of Scarcity,” observed Rex Tillerson, the 
chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, “we are now witnessing the 
transition to a new Era of Abundance.”37  This transition, he said in 
2013, will “spur economic growth, create jobs, and strengthen energy 
security.”38 
The shift from scarcity to abundance has been both 
extraordinary and unexpected.  In 2005, when U.S. leaders were still 
warning of increased dependence on unreliable foreign suppliers, 
innovators in the oil and gas industry were already deploying new 
technologies with explosive potential.  These included, most of all, 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or fracking—techniques 
that permit the exploitation of previously inaccessible oil and natural 
gas reserves in shale and other impermeable rock formations.  Other 
innovations allow for the extraction of oil and gas in Arctic and deep-
offshore waters, and for the conversion of bitumen and other heavy 
oils, such as Canadian tar sands (also called “oil sands”) into usable 
products.39  Together, these technologies have allowed for a dramatic 
turnaround in North American oil and gas output.  Oil production in 
the United States jumped from 7.6 million barrels per day in 2010 to 
10.0 million barrels in 2013, an increase of thirty-two percent in just 
three years.  If current estimates by the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) prove accurate, domestic output will jump to 
12.8 million barrels per day in 2020, the highest it has been since 
1972.40  Natural gas production in the United States is also predicted 
                                                
37 Rex Tillerson, Capitalizing on the Coming Era of Energy Abundance, 
Address to Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, (Apr. 2, 2013) (transcript available 
at http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/news-and-
updates/speeches/capitalizing-on-coming-era-of-energy-abundance). 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., MICHAEL LEVI, THE POWER SURGE: ENERGY, OPPORTUNITY, 
AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2013). 
40 See Table 1, infra.   
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to see a sharp increase, with output climbing from 21.3 trillion cubic 
feet in 2010 to an estimated 31.4 trillion in 2035.41  Canada, 
meanwhile, is expected to see its oil output jump from 3.6 million 
barrels per day in 2010 to 6.1 million barrels in 2035, with most of 
this increase coming from Alberta’s tar sands.42 
Not only is the United States enjoying an increase in domestic 
energy output, but it is also using less oil.  Total consumption 
dropped from a high of 20.7 million barrels per day in 2007 to 18.6 
million barrels in 2012, and is expected to remain at that level for the 
indefinite future.43  When combined with rising domestic oil output, 
this decline has resulted in a significantly reduced need for imported 
oil.  From a peak of 13.8 million barrels per day in 2007 (or sixty-
seven percent of total U.S. consumption), U.S. oil imports fell to 8.9 
million barrels in 2013 (forty-seven percent of consumption).  
According to the most recent EIA projections, U.S. oil imports will 
decline even further in the years ahead to 6.7 million barrels per day 
in 2020 (thirty-four percent of consumption).44  Of this 6.7 million 
barrels, moreover, approximately half is expected to come from 
Canada (mostly in the form of diluted bitumen), reducing U.S. 
reliance on imports from extra-hemispheric sources even further. 
Although the United States and Canada are, at present, the 
principal beneficiaries of the revolution in energy technology, they 
are not expected to remain the sole proprietors of these new 
techniques.  Many other countries possess large deposits of shale oil 
and gas and are beginning to employ hydraulic fracturing in a drive to 
exploit these reserves.  China and Russia, for example, have 
announced ambitious plans to develop their extensive shale deposits, 
as have Argentina, Poland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and South 
                                                
41 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2040 A-28, Table A14 (2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282014%29.pdf. 
42 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 
247, Table G1 (2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484%282013%29.pdf.  
43 Id. at 184, Table A5. 
44 Id. at 247, Table G. 
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Africa.45  Similarly, nations with significant offshore and Arctic 
reserves, including Canada, China, Norway, Russia, and Vietnam, 
have marshaled advanced technologies to develop these resources.  
As a result, global supplies of oil and natural gas are expected to 
remain relatively robust for years to come.46 
As suggested by the IEA in its 2012 report, these 
developments are bound to affect energy geopolitics in many ways.  
Some of these effects are not likely to be evident for many years, but 
some are already being felt.  In particular, the new energy abundance 
appears to be altering U.S. relations with the Persian Gulf, Russia, 
and Europe.  At the same time, new forms of energy-related 
competition and conflict are emerging in other areas, including 
Eurasia, the Arctic, and the deep oceans. 
IV.  AMERICA’S “ENDURING POSTURE” IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
For some analysts, the natural response to diminished U.S. 
reliance on Middle Eastern oil would be the withdrawal of American 
forces from the Gulf and their deployment elsewhere to areas of 
greater strategic significance.  As paraphrased by The Economist, these 
analysts argue that “if America can produce its own oil . . . why waste 
so much blood and treasure policing the Middle East?”47  On the 
surface, this outlook seems to make eminent sense, especially given 
the high cost of maintaining a substantial military presence in the 
Gulf at a time of diminished budget allocations.  However, most 
senior policymakers reject this option, saying the Gulf area remains 
                                                
45 See Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment 
of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (last updated June 13, 2013),  
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ (assessing global shale oil and 
gas reserves); see INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 50-56 
(discussing plans for the exploitation of shale gas reserves). 
46 WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 1, at 81–154.   
47 The Petrostate of America, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21596521-energy-boom-good-america-
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vital to U.S. security.48  Because the continued flow of Middle Eastern 
oil is considered essential to world economic vigor—whether or not 
that oil flows to U.S. markets—any significant U.S. military 
withdrawal could lead to increased regional instability, disruptions in 
the oil flow, and global economic chaos.  As noted by Rex Tillerson 
of Exxon, the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf oil is essential “to 
global economic stability,” and thus to U.S. security.49  Even if “we’re 
no longer getting any oil from the Middle East because we’re secure 
here,” he explained, “a disruption of oil supplies from that region will 
have devastating impacts on global economies,” ours included.50 
This logic appears to have persuaded President Obama, who 
has pledged to retain a strong military presence in the Gulf.  “The 
United States of America is prepared to use all elements of our 
power, including military force, to secure our core interests in the 
region,” he told the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 
2013.51  “We will ensure the free flow of energy from the region to 
the world.”52  Even though America is steadily reducing its 
dependence on imported oil, he explained, “the world still depends 
on the region’s energy supply, and a severe disruption could 
destabilize the entire global economy.”53 
                                                
48 See Thom Shanker & Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Planning Troop Buildup in 
Gulf after Exit from Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/middleeast/united-states-plans-
post-iraq-troop-increase-in-persian-gulf.html?_r=1&.  
49 Rex Tillerson, “The New North American Energy Paradigm,” Address 
at the Council of Foreign Relations (June 27, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.cfr.org/north-america/new-north-american-energy-paradigm-
reshaping-future/p28630). 
50 Id. 
51 President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama in Address to 
the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-
obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly) [hereinafter Obama to U.N. 
General Assembly]. 
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53 Id. 
2015 Klare 3:2 
 
25 
 
Obama has also indicated that there will be a major shift in 
U.S. strategy in the region.  Instead of employing troops on the 
ground to affect the outcome of regional power struggles as it has in 
the past, the United States will rely on air and naval forces to ensure 
the uninterrupted transportation of oil.  This requires maintaining 
sufficient forces in the area to prevent any attempt by Iran to block 
the Strait of Hormuz, the crucial waterway connecting the Gulf to the 
Indian Ocean.  According to the New York Times, President Obama, 
through intermediaries, has told Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei, that closing the Strait of Hormuz is a “red line” that 
would provoke an automatic U.S. military response.54  To ensure that 
this is not an empty threat, Obama has ordered the Pentagon to 
deploy sufficient air and naval strength in the area to overcome any 
move by Iran to block the Strait.  In the event Iran attempted such a 
move, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, said the United States will “take action and reopen the Strait.”55 
It is evident, however, that U.S. policy extends beyond simply 
keeping the Strait open.  As suggested by Obama in his 2013 speech 
to the United Nations, the United States intends to remain the 
dominant military power in the region and exercise ultimate control 
over the global flow of oil—and this, in fact, remains one of the 
principal missions of the U.S. Central Command.56  “The U.S. fully 
intends to maintain a strong and enduring military posture in the 
[Gulf] region, one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression 
and assure our allies,” declared CENTCOM commander General 
Lloyd J. Austin III in his March 2014 testimony before Congress.57  
This “enduring posture” is intended to overcome any threats to 
                                                
54 Elisabeth Bumiller, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Sends Top 
Iranian Leader a Warning on Strait Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/middleeast/us-warns-top-iran-
leader-not-to-shut-strait-of-hormuz.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.  
55 Id. 
56 Obama to U.N. General Assembly, supra note 51. 
57 General Lloyd J.Austin III, Statement before the House Armed 
Services Committee (Mar. 5, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/commanders-posture-statement-
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regional security and the safety of oil exports, but also to deter any 
other power from assuming such a role. 
This posture was on clear display in the spring of 2014, when 
Islamic militants invaded Iraq from their strongholds in Syria and 
captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city.  With these militants—
largely Sunnis under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS)—in control of major population centers and key energy 
infrastructure, President Obama decided to send hundreds of U.S. 
military advisers to Iraq to help the beleaguered forces of Prime 
Minister Haider al-Abadi fend off the threat to Baghdad and Shiite-
populated areas in the south.  “We will be helping Iraqis as they take 
the fight to terrorists who threaten the Iraqi people, the region and 
American interests as well,” Obama told reporters on June 19.58  
How this initiative will evolve in the months ahead cannot be 
foreseen, but it starkly testifies to Washington’s enduring interest in 
the stability of the Persian Gulf area. 
V.  INCREASED UNITED STATES PRESSURE ON RUSSIA 
If increased North American energy output has failed to 
produce a dramatic shift in U.S. ties with the Persian Gulf area, it is 
having a significant impact on U.S. relations with Europe and 
Russia—particularly in response to the Ukraine crisis of 2013-14.  
Even before Russia seized Crimea and began its meddling in eastern 
Ukraine, U.S. pundits and policymakers were calling on the Obama 
administration to facilitate the export of U.S. natural gas to Europe as 
a way of reducing Europe’s reliance on Russian gas—and thus, it was 
claimed, Europe’s excessive deference to Moscow’s political 
preferences.59  Once the crisis broke out, these calls became even 
                                                
58 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Situation in 
Iraq (June 19, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq). 
59 See Coral Davenport & Steven Erlanger, U.S. Hopes Boom in Natural Gas 
Can Curb Putin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/europe/us-seeks-to-reduce-
ukraines-reliance-on-russia-for-natural-gas.html. 
2015 Klare 3:2 
 
27 
 
more strident, with Republicans in Congress introducing legislation 
to eliminate regulatory barriers to such exports. 
At present, Europe relies on natural gas for about one-fourth 
of its total energy consumption, with about thirty percent of that gas 
coming from Russia.  Europe’s dependence on Russian gas is a 
product of several factors, including proximity, prolific Russian gas 
deposits, limited European reserves, and an elaborate system of 
pipelines connecting Russian fields to European markets.60  To 
further cement these ties, Gazprom—the Russian state-controlled gas 
behemoth—has established partnerships with many of the leading 
European gas-distribution companies, including Eni of Italy and 
E.ON of Germany.61  Ukraine occupies a particularly significant role 
in this elaborate system, as more than half of all the gas supplied to 
Europe by Russia in 2013 was carried through pipelines crossing that 
country.62 
Because so much of Europe’s gas is obtained from pipelines 
that pass through Ukraine, European consumers have periodically 
suffered from shortages resulting from Moscow’s efforts to 
intimidate Ukrainian officials by halting or reducing the inflow of gas 
into those conduits, usually during negotiations over the price 
Ukraine pays for its imports of Russian gas.  Initially, when Ukraine 
first separated from the former Soviet Union in 1991, Gazprom 
provided it with gas at a discounted rate compared to what the same 
gas sold for in Western Europe.  As Ukraine moved closer to the 
West, however, Moscow raised the price it charged Ukraine for gas.  
When Ukrainian officials refused to pay the higher amount, Moscow 
cut off supplies—thereby reducing or eliminating the flow to 
                                                
60 See generally Russia, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Russia/russia.pdf; see also 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 45, 51, 58. 
61 See 16% of Natural Gas Consumed in Europe Flows through Ukraine, 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 14, 2014), 
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European recipients further along the pipelines’ path.63  In response, 
individual European countries and the European Union have 
adopted a series of measures intended to reduce their reliance on 
Russian gas and/or their exposure to political strife in Ukraine.  
These have included the construction of Nordstream, a Russian-
German pipeline that bypasses Ukraine, and plans for additional 
pipelines that rely on non-Russian sources in the Middle East and 
Africa.64 
American officials have long urged Europeans to further 
reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas, saying such reliance 
undermines Euro-Atlantic solidarity and, accordingly, NATO’s ability 
to confront Moscow in a crisis.  In particular, Washington has sought 
to persuade European leaders to accelerate the construction of 
pipelines that would bypass Russia and to increase their reliance on 
imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which can be shipped from 
numerous suppliers, including the United States.  The Obama 
administration has also encouraged Europeans to develop their 
domestic reserves of shale gas, further diminishing their reliance on 
Russian supplies.65 
Not surprisingly, these efforts received a substantial boost 
when the Ukraine crisis erupted in the fall of 2013.  This crisis had 
many roots, including anger over widespread governmental 
corruption and a desire on the part of many Ukrainians to reduce 
their economic ties to Moscow, but also revolved to a considerable 
degree around energy issues.  As part of the “association agreement” 
Kiev was planning to sign with the European Union prior to the 
onset of the crisis, Ukraine’s energy systems would come under 
                                                
63 See DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE 
REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 239–41 (2011). 
64 Id. at 241-43; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM 
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EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGY (May 28, 2014), 
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European Union rules and regulations on competition and 
transparency,66 thereby precluding secret deals of the sort previously 
concluded between Ukraine’s natural gas oligarchs and their 
counterparts in Russia. Under pressure from Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, 
scrapped the European Union deal and opted instead for closer ties 
with Moscow—thereby triggering the mass protests that eventually 
led to his flight and the establishment of a new government in Kiev.67  
Russia, fearing the loss of its influence in the region and key strategic 
assets, seized Crimea and instigated an anti-government insurgency in 
eastern Ukraine.  Although driven in part by nationalistic impulses, 
Putin’s seizure of Crimea gave Russia control over a significant swath 
of the Black Sea thought to house substantial reserves of oil and 
natural gas.68 
To discourage further adventurism by Moscow, the United 
States has imposed tough sanctions on key members of Putin’s inner 
circle and warned of further such measures if Moscow does not 
exercise restraint.  Recognizing that U.S. efforts alone are insufficient 
to deter Moscow, American leaders have also sought to stiffen 
Europe’s resistance to Russian provocations by helping to reduce its 
reliance on Russian natural gas.69  As suggested by House Speaker 
John A. Boehner, European reliance on Russian energy “has 
diplomatic repercussions, making them more reluctant to challenge 
some of Mr. Putin’s arrogant actions.”  The answer to this dilemma, 
                                                
66 EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION 
AGREEMENT – THE COMPLETE TEXTS, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm. 
67 See Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.  
68 See William J. Broad, In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2014, 
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he suggested, is to provide Europe with gas from America’s “vast 
supplies of natural energy.”70 
Before the United States can act on this strategy, however, 
the White House must facilitate the construction of new facilities for 
converting domestic gas supplies into LNG, thereby enabling its 
shipment to Europe by sea.  At present, only one such facility, at 
Sabine Pass, Louisiana, has received the necessary permits and is 
actually under construction.  Plans for another half-dozen such 
facilities have received preliminary clearance and are expected to 
proceed into development, but will not commence operations for 
several years; applications for another twenty-four LNG terminals are 
under evaluation by the Department of Energy.71  Part of the holdup 
is existing U.S. legislation, which requires a comprehensive 
assessment of each facility’s contribution to the national interest.  In 
response to the Russian intervention in Ukraine, however, American 
politicians are calling for the adoption of new rules allowing a more 
rapid approval process.  In March, Boehner declared that 
“[e]xpediting approval of natural gas exports is one clear step the U.S. 
can take to stand by our allies and stand up to Russian aggression.”72 
Although calls for quicker approval of LNG export facilities 
enjoy strong support in Washington and are likely to result in new 
rules and regulations, some analysts question whether such actions 
will have any significant impact on Putin’s strategic calculations.  For 
one thing, the earliest U.S. shipments of LNG to Europe will not 
occur until late 2015 or early 2016, by which time the political 
situation in Ukraine will, presumably, be resolved.  Furthermore, the 
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added cost of liquefying the gas, shipping it across the Atlantic, and 
turning it back into gas at the other end will make U.S. gas as 
expensive as Russian gas, eliminating some of the incentive to switch.  
On top of this, LNG prices in Asia are significantly higher than those 
in Europe, so future U.S. exports are likely to cross the Pacific, not 
the Atlantic.73 
Despite these doubts, U.S. leaders are likely to continue 
advocating the shipment of U.S. gas to Europe as a way of exploiting 
growing U.S. energy abundance for political advantage.  “Moscow is 
not immune from pressure,” former Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice wrote in March.74  The Putin regime relies on oil and gas exports 
for its economic survival, she noted.  But soon, “North America’s 
bounty of oil and gas will swamp Moscow’s capacity,” deterring 
Russian adventurism.75 
VI.  NEW SITES OF CONTENTION 
The introduction of new modes of extraction is altering the 
global geopolitical equation in other significant ways.  Among many 
noteworthy effects, new modes of extraction enable the exploitation 
of once-inaccessible oil and gas reserves in the Arctic and the deep 
oceans.  In some cases, however, the ownership of these reserves is 
in dispute, as they lie in areas with unresolved boundaries.  This is 
producing new sources of friction and conflict, as nations fight for 
control over these promising resources. 
                                                
73 See, e.g., Stephen Munson, Can U.S. Natural Gas Rescue Ukraine from 
Russia? WASH. POST WONKBLOG, Mar. 25, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/03/25/can-u-s-
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Energy companies have, of course, long drilled for oil and 
natural gas in shallow coastal areas adjacent to their onshore deposits, 
for example, in waters of the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana and in the 
Caspian Sea off Baku in what is now Azerbaijan.  The development 
of deepwater drilling, however, is a relatively recent phenomenon.  In 
2005, Chevron set a record by drilling in 3,500 feet of water in the 
Gulf of Mexico, a major site for deepwater innovation.  Just one year 
later, Chevron doubled that depth at its Jack No. 2 well at another 
Gulf location.76  Shell was the next to break records, announcing in 
2010 that it had drilled 8,000 feet beneath sea level at its Perdido 
field, 200 miles east of the Texas coastline.77 Brazilians are also 
beginning to reach extreme depths in their efforts to exploit newly 
discovered undersea reservoirs in the South Atlantic, called “pre-salt” 
fields because they lie below a thick layer of salt.78 Record-breaking 
depths have also been reached in waters off India and Angola. 
The introduction of deep-sea drilling technologies is expected 
to result in a substantial increase in hydrocarbon output from 
offshore fields.  “In deepwater around the world, our industry’s 
technologies will allow production to more than double over the next 
30 years,” Exxon’s Tillerson affirmed in 2013.79  At the same time, 
however, the onset of drilling in some offshore areas is generating 
new sources of conflict, as countries fight over the possession of 
undersea reserves in disputed maritime areas.  While some offshore 
fields lie in areas that are under the undisputed jurisdiction of 
adjacent countries, such as Shell’s and Chevron’s operations in the 
U.S. portion of the Gulf of Mexico, others lie in areas that are 
disputed by two or more countries, as is the case of promising 
reserves in the East and South China Seas.80 
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The East and South China Seas are semi-enclosed extensions 
of the western Pacific Ocean that harbor a number of small 
uninhabited islands and are bordered by China and a number of 
other states: the East China Sea by Japan and Taiwan; the South 
China Sea by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam.81  In both cases, the bordering countries have laid claim to 
significant swaths of these waters, citing historical ownership of 
assorted islands as well as development rights provided under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  The 
UNCLOS treaty, first approved in 1982, grants signatory powers an 
“exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) extending up to 200 nautical miles 
from their coastline.  In the case of continental states, such as China, 
the UNCLOS treaty also allows them to exploit their outer 
continental shelf, even if it extends beyond 200 miles.  Given the 
relatively small size of these two seas, this has led to a welter of 
overlapping claims to the waters involved, with China claiming the 
lion’s share of both areas and the other states contending with both 
China and their immediate neighbors.82  To demonstrate their resolve 
to protect their claims, most of these countries have deployed naval 
or coast guard vessels in their respective EEZs.  On some occasions, 
this has resulted in maritime clashes between the contending forces.83 
Energy analysts are divided over the energy potential of the 
East and South China Seas, but both are believed to harbor 
significant reserves of oil and natural gas.  According to the EIA, the 
                                                
81 On disputes in the East China Sea, see East China Sea, ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-
topics.cfm?fips=ECS; for more information on disputes in the South China Sea, 
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East China Sea holds between 60 and 100 million barrels of oil and 
between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.  Chinese experts, 
however, see a much larger potential: as much as 70 to 160 billion 
barrels of oil and 250 to 300 trillion cubic feet of gas.84  A similar 
mismatch prevails in estimates of reserves in the South China Sea: the 
EIA sees only 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of 
gas, while Chinese experts see as much as 125 billion barrels of oil 
and up to 500 trillion cubic feet of gas.85  Very little systematic testing 
has been conducted in these areas, so it is impossible to verify these 
estimates.  Nevertheless, it is evident that both bodies of water 
possess oil and gas reserves on a scale sufficient to attract the interest 
of all surrounding countries. 
Until now, most of the drilling in the East and South China 
Seas has occurred at sites in the undisputed EEZs of one or another 
of the states involved.  Recently, however, China has begun drilling in 
parts of the South China Sea claimed by Vietnam, provoking naval 
clashes and anti-Chinese riots in Vietnamese cities.  The most serious 
episode erupted in May 2014, when the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) deployed its largest deepwater drilling rig, the 
HD-981, in waters off the northern coast of Vietnam.86  Once 
emplaced in the drilling area, the Chinese surrounded the HD-981 
with a large flotilla of naval and coast guard ships; and when 
Vietnamese coast guard vessels attempted to penetrate this defensive 
ring in an effort to drive off the rig, they were rammed by Chinese 
ships and pummeled by water cannon.  No lives were lost in those 
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encounters, but anti-Chinese rioting in Vietnam proper led to several 
deaths and scores of injuries.87 
As noted in most press accounts of these events, the naval 
clashes and rioting sparked by the deployment of HD-981 in 
Vietnamese-claimed waters were driven in large part by nationalism 
and resentment over past humiliations.  The Chinese, insisting that 
the islands in the South China Sea were once ruled by China, are 
seeking to overcome the territorial losses they suffered under the 
sway of the Western imperial powers and Imperial Japan. Similarly, 
the Vietnamese, long accustomed to Chinese invasions, seek to 
protect what they view as their sovereign territory.  Despite the socio-
political implications, the energy dimensions of the conflict should 
not be minimized.  Both China and Vietnam are determined to 
exploit the oil and gas reserves of the South China Sea, and neither 
shows any inclination to compromise on their respective claims.88  
The same can be said of the Philippines with respect to its swath of 
that sea, and of Japan with respect to contested areas of the East 
China Sea.  So long as these bodies of water are viewed as a valuable 
source of energy, the parties to these disputes are likely to persist in 
their efforts to exploit what they view as their rightful resources—
even if this means risking armed conflict with their neighbors. 
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VII.  THE MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC 
The development of new drilling technologies is also leading 
to increased oil and gas drilling in the Arctic region—and here, too, 
disputes have arisen over the ownership of valuable reserves. 
The Arctic region, encompassing the northern reaches of 
Alaska, Canada, Norway, and Russia, plus the Arctic Ocean itself, 
occupies only six percent of the Earth’s surface yet is believed to 
house approximately thirty percent of the world’s undiscovered 
natural gas and thirteen percent of its undiscovered oil.89  Until 
recently, the Arctic’s harsh weather conditions and year-round ice 
cover made it highly unattractive as a site for oil and gas drilling; 
however, as a result of climate change and the introduction of ice-
hardened drilling rigs, energy companies are finding it easier to 
operate in the region.  With sea ice now vastly reduced in summer 
months, the drilling season has been extended and drilling platforms 
can operate further north.  To take advantage of these conditions, oil 
companies are stepping up their efforts to exploit the Arctic’s energy 
resources.90  Royal Dutch Shell, for example, is attempting to drill in 
areas of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas off Alaska, while Statoil is 
extracting gas from Norway’s sector of the Barents Sea, and 
Gazprom is preparing to drill in the Pechora Sea off northern Siberia.  
Many other such endeavors, including a collaborative effort between 
Exxon and Rosneft to exploit oil reserves in the Kara Sea, are likely 
to get under way in the years ahead.91 
                                                
89 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL: 
ESTIMATED OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 
(2008), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. 
90 See, e.g., RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153, 
CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Aug. 4, 
2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf; see also Philip Budzik, Arctic Oil 
and Natural Gas Potential, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. OFFICE OF INTEGRATED 
ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/pdf/arctic_oil.pdf. 
91 For background on these endeavors, see THE RACE FOR WHAT’S LEFT, 
supra note 76, at 70–93; see also Clifford Krauss, Exxon and Russia’s Oil Company in 
Deal for Joint Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2012, 
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Although promising as a fresh source of energy, the 
development of the Arctic’s oil and gas reserves is likely to spark new 
geopolitical tensions.  This is due to the region’s immense resource 
potential and the fact that disputes have arisen over the location of 
offshore boundaries in the Arctic Ocean—and thus over the 
ownership of certain promising energy reserves.  The United States, 
for example, has a boundary dispute with Russia in the Bering Sea 
and with Canada in the Beaufort Sea; Canada has a dispute of its own 
with Greenland over their mutual boundary; and Greenland has one 
with Iceland.92  All of these countries, moreover, are vying for control 
over the outer Arctic, beyond their respective 200-nautical-mile 
EEZs.  These disputes would not provoke much concern in the 
absence of major energy deposits, but take on increased significance 
when the countries involved hope to procure significant economic 
benefits from the disputed areas.  As noted by Secretary of Defense 
Chuck Hagel in November 2013, “a flood of interest in energy 
exploration [in the Arctic] has the potential to heighten tensions over 
other issues.”93 
The risk of tension and conflict in the Arctic is further 
exacerbated by the determination of key regional policymakers to rely 
on military power to reinforce their claims to contested territories.  
Although the Arctic states have pledged to refrain from the use of 
force in asserting their claims, most have taken steps to enhance their 
capacity to engage in combat operations in the area.94  Russia, for 
example, has announced plans to establish new bases in the Arctic 
                                                
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/business/energy-environment/exxon-and-
russian-oil-company-agree-to-joint-
projects.html?_r=1&&gwh=D4243D6AF66DF59057355FEED9D935F8&gwt=pa
y. 
92 For background on Arctic boundary disputes, see Reginald R. Smith, 
The Arctic: A New Partnership Paradigm of the Next “Cold War”? 63 JOINT FORCES 
Q.,117–24 (2011); see also Changes in the Arctic, supra note 90, at 15–16. 
93 Chuck Hagel, Speech at the Halifax International Security Forum 
(Nov. 22, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1821). 
94 See, e.g., Heather Conley & Jamie Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the 
Arctic: An Assessment of the Current Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation, CTR. 
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 2010); Smith, supra note 92, at 124. 
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and to deploy specially equipped combat forces there.  This buildup, 
said President Putin, “will make it possible to substantially strengthen 
our military and border security and also to increase the effectiveness 
of the protection of natural resources.”95  Canada has also taken steps 
to bolster its presence in the Arctic, establishing a new base at 
Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island and ordering a new fleet of ice-
hardened patrol ships.96  Norway, which shares a border with Russia 
in its far north, has relocated its combined military headquarters to 
Boda, above the Arctic Circle, and has taken other steps to bolster its 
Arctic combat capabilities.97 
The potential for friction and conflict arising from the 
contention over prime Arctic real estate is further exacerbated by the 
lack of a clear legal regime and adjudicative system for the resolution 
of Arctic boundary disputes.  UNCLOS provides conflicting 
guidance on the determination of offshore territories, awarding 
coastal states a 200-mile EEZ but also allowing them to claim control 
over their outer continental shelf, even if it extends beyond 200 
nautical miles.  The Convention also provides for the adjudication of 
offshore boundary disputes by the newly-established International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but few states have been willing to 
bring their disputes to this body, which only examines cases brought 
on a voluntary basis.98  The only other international organization with 
jurisdiction in the region, the Arctic Council, is not empowered to 
address territorial disputes.99  It is likely, then, that these disputes will 
                                                
95 Jacob Kipp, Russian Strategic Interests Expand in the Arctic, 8 EURASIA 
DAILY MONITOR 173 (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38430&no_cach
e=1#.VNfS5HacMU1; for background on Russian military initiatives in the Arctic, 
see Conley and Kraut, supra note 94, at 23–25. 
96 See Conley and Kraut, supra note 94, at 17–18. 
97 Id. at 21–23. 
98 See generally RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42784, 
MARITIME TERRITORIAL AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) DISPUTES 
INVOLVING CHINA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf; see also International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea, The Tribunal, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=0.  
99 See Arctic Council, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
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continue to fester as the drive to exploit the Arctic’s energy riches 
gains momentum. 
VIII.  THE ROAD AHEAD 
As this brief survey suggests, the geopolitics of energy was 
long governed by expectations of scarcity—the presumption that oil 
and natural gas reserves are limited in extent, and that, as global 
demand increased, the competition for what remained would become 
increasingly intense and fractious.  In fact, significant shortages and 
supply disruptions have occurred in past decades, lending credibility 
to this presumption.  However, earlier predictions that the world of 
2014 would be facing a downward curve in the global supply of 
hydrocarbons have been replaced by expectations of energy 
abundance, stretching out for decades to come.  Indeed, many 
analysts now suggest that the global demand for fossil fuels like oil 
and natural gas will begin to contract long before supplies disappear, 
as countries around the world institute measures to reduce emissions 
of climate-altering greenhouse gases.100  Under these circumstances, 
we might reasonably expect a dramatic shift in the character of 
energy geopolitics, with considerably less emphasis on the use of 
force to secure overseas sources of supply.  Yet, while there has been 
some alteration in the global policy landscape, conflict over energy 
continues to convulse international affairs. 
Several factors can be identified to explain the persistence of 
energy competition and conflict.  To begin with, the expectations of 
abundance expressed in the United States, Canada, and some other 
countries are not shared by all major energy consumers.  The leaders 
of China and Japan, for example, continue to worry about their 
ability to procure sufficient oil and gas supplies from foreign 
suppliers to meet their long-term requirements.  And while the new 
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extractive technologies are expected to permit the exploitation of vast 
hydrocarbon reserves in such locales as Argentina, Brazil, China, 
Russia, and Saudi Arabia, it is still not known whether they will 
perform as well in these places as they have in the United States and 
Canada.101  Under these circumstances, many countries will continue 
to view energy through the lens of potential scarcity, as they have in 
the past. 
Even if oil and natural gas prove to be more abundant than 
originally assumed, these products continue to be viewed as vital 
materials whose possession, in adequate amounts, is essential for the 
well-being and security of the nation.  As noted by Robert E. Ebel of 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in a 2002 address at 
the State Department, “[o]il fuels much more than automobiles and 
airplanes.  Oil fuels military power, national treasuries, and 
international politics.”102  Far more than an ordinary trade 
commodity, “it is a determinant of well-being, of national security, 
and international power for those who possess this vital resource and 
the converse for those who do not.”103  This assessment has 
governed international policymaking for over a century, and while the 
widespread introduction of renewable energy may, in time, render it 
moot, it will continue to shape the foreign and security policies of 
nation-states for some time to come. 
The struggle for control over key deposits of energy has been 
a significant source of conflict in the past, and is likely to remain so 
for some time into the future.  The nature, locale, and dynamics of 
such conflict may well experience change in the years ahead, but the 
underlying motive—to ensure adequate supplies to satisfy critical 
national requirements—will not. 
 
                                                
101 See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 51–
55. 
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Table 1: U.S. Oil Production, Consumption, and Imports, Actual 
2005-2013 and Projected 2015-2040 (in million barrels per day) 
 Oil 
Consumption 
Oil 
Production  
Oil 
Imports 
Imports as % 
of 
consumption 
2005 
Actual (A) 
20.8 6.9 13.9 66.8 
2010 A 19.1 7.6 11.6 60.5 
2013 A* 18.9 10.0 8.9 47.0 
2015 
Projected 
(P) 
19.1 12.2 6.9 36.1 
2020 P 19.5 12.8 6.7 34.4 
2025 P 19.2 12.1 6.9 35.9 
2030 P 18.7 11.5 7.2 38.5 
2035 P 18.6 11.6 7.0 37.6 
2040 P 18.6 11.7 6.9 37.1 
 
Source for Actual data: BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD 
ENERGY JUNE 2013 8, 9 (2013), 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statisticalreview/statistic
al_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf. 
Source for Projected data: ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL 
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at Tables A5, G1. 
Source for 2013: Petroleum and Other Liquids Supply and 
Disposition, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_snd_d_nus_mbblpd_a_cur.
htm. 
 
